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Introduction
Since Diamond's (1965) séminal contribution, several authors havc
elaborated on the possibility of dynamic inefficiency in varions alternative
frameworks.
The présent paper follows the Une of research orieinated bv Tirole
(1985).
That contribution studies, in an otherwise standard version of Dia
mond's niodel, not only the possibility of bubbles but also the implications
of an asset that brings a real rent, Tirole shows that. if rents per periôd are
capitalised in advance and if they increase at the (asymptotic) rate of éco
nomie growth. a perfect foresight equilibrium must bc efficient. Were tins
not true, the rent per period would grow at a rate exceeding the rate of
interest and its market value would be infinité.
Tirole ((1985) p. 1074) provides several examples of assets bringing a
real rent, such as natural resources, laiid, decreasing returu to scale techno
logies and paintings and jewels for their consumption value.
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Since in exogenous growth models dynamically inefficient steady state
equilibria prompt for Pareto improving policy actions1, it is not surprising
that each of thèse examples has been analysed in the literature.
The rôle of paintings and jewels is outlined by Tirole himself ((1985)
p. 1080). An asset of this type provides rents that cannot be capitalised
before the création of the asset itself. In such case, bubbles (and dynamic
inefiieiency) need not be inconsistent with rents per period growing at the
same rate of the économie System, since the flow of rents stemming from a
single spécifie asset does not grow and must be capitalised using the interest
rate.
In contrast to this analysis, McCallum (1987) and Homburg (1991),
assign to land an explicit rôle in aggregate production and rule out ineffi
cient equilibria. In fact, in their models, the marginal product of land (the
rent) grows at the asymptotical growth rate of output2. Clearly, this resuit
dépends on the characteristics of the aggregate production function; it does
not hold, as suggested by O'Connel and Zeldes ((1988) pp. 441-2, fn. 19),
whenever the land income share vanishes in the long run. Homburg (1991)
and Rhee (1991) provide two différent formalisations for this latter point.
Moreover. Rhee notes that the décline in the US land income share, during
the post-war period, has not been quick enough to be conclusive.
The case of a decreasing returns-to-scale technology has been analysed
by Dechert and Yamamoto (1992) in a (stochastic) overlapping générations
model with no population growth3. In their setting, rents are distributed to
shareholders as dividends and thèse agents, who are old, sell (non bubbly)
stocks to the young. Since the equities values would approach infinity as
the interest rate gets closer and closer to nought, Dechert and Yamamoto
conclude that "the stock market serves the same purpose as the transver-
sality condition in an infinité-horizon growth model" ((1992) p. 399). This
model suffers from two drawbacks : the number of firms is not endogenously
determined and, in case of population growth, the share of rents on output
would continuously grow over time, a rather counterfactual implication.
In this paper, we study the rôle of pure profits taking a route that
is similar to the one followed by Dechert and Yamamoto. We describe an
environment where many identical firms are operative, their number being
large enough that perfect compétition can be assumed. In our model, the
(gross) production function of each firni is strictly convex, i.e. returns to
scale are decreasing. Entry is not constrained, so that the number of firms
1 With endogenous growth, Ihe picture changes dramaticaily : a réduction in the capital stock cannot make
everybody better off since it is harmful for growth (see King and Ferguson (1993)). The interest rate may stili
be lowerthan the growth rate, giving room to bubbles, but thèse, in gênerai, are harmful to society (Grossman
and Yanagawa (1993)). However, in this paper we do not wish to be involved with the implications of the
endogenous growth models.
2 A similar point has been made by Muiler and Woodford ((1988) p. 962) while considering a model where
finitely and infinitely lived agents coexist.
3 Although Dechert and Yamamoto's model is stochastic, their point concerning dynamic efficiency can be
easily recasted in a deterministic framework.Gianluca Femminis
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increases over time in response to population growth (and aggregate returns
to scale are constant). The présence of a fixed cost, that is to be paid upon
entering the market, détermines endogenously the number of firms that
are operative at every instant of time4. We also introduce a constant and
exogenous probability of failure affecting firms.
In a context where the entrance of new firms plays an important rôle,
it seemed natural to avoid the rigid timing entailed by the standard two pe-
riods overlapping générations model. Hence, to model the "consumers' side!1,
we adopt Buiter's (1988) continuous time framework, which allows both for
a positive probability of death at the individual level and for agents discon-
nectedness in the sensé of Weil (1989). However, one can show that, under
appropriate conditions (a time-separable utility function and a sufficieritly
low labour income during the second period of life), our results hold true
also in a standard framework à la Diamond.
The central resuit of the présent paper is that dynamic inefficiency is
impossible only if population does not grow and if the probability of failure
for firms is zéro. Hence. the présence of a decreasing returns technology
distinguishes the présent settings from the standard model, where dynamic
inefficiency with stationary population is possible (for a direct comparison,
see Blanchard (1985)); however, we show that decreasing returns at the
firm's level are not per se sufficient to solve the problem.
The fixed entry cost proves to be fondamental for our resuit, since it
implies the equality, in the long run equilibrium, between the growth rate
for the number of firms and the one for population and output. Therefore,
any existing firrn does not grow over time and, in discounting future profits,
it does not modify the interest rate with the growth rate : if population
increases over time the interest rate might be lower than the growth rate.
Dynamic inefficiency is possible also when population is stationary
but the probability of failure is positive. The interprétation for this resuit is
again simple : in the steady state, the représentative firm does not grow due
to the characteristics of the sunk cost; however the firm takes account of the
probability of failure in evaluating future profits. This heavier discounting
keeps the value of firms positive even if the marginal productivity of capital
becomes négative.
In what follows, we start summarising the behaviour of our continuum
of agents; we then présent the supply-side of the économie System (section
II), and we characterise and discuss the steady state properties of the model
(section III and IV, respectively). For simplicity, we assume away, throu-
ghout the paper, government debt, public expenditure and hence taxation.
Section V concludes.
We hâve in mind a situation where decreasing returns are due, e.g.. to the need, for each firm, of purchasing
an (indivisible) building or machinery of relevant size. Also, the requirement for entrepreneurs or managers
may play a rôle. Notice that an alternative set of assumptions contemplâtes the présence of identical firms
that compete "à la Bertrand" : the undercutting behaviour implies that the price is equal to the marginal cost.
With decreasing returns to scale, this hypothesis involves the présence of some profit, which, as will be
clear in the sequel, is important to détermine endogenously the number of firms.Recherches économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 66(1), 2000
1 Aggregate consumption and asset accumulation
Following Blanchard (1985), we assume that each individual agent
faces a constant, instantaneous probability of death, A, that also represents,
due to the law of large numbers, the fraction of each cohort that dies at
every instant. This hypothesis, together with the one of a constant birth
rate /?, as in Buiter (1988). lias the relevant merit of allowing aggregation.
1.1 Individual consumption
To keep the analysis simple, we adopt, at the single agent's level, a
logarithmic spécification for the time separable utility function. Thus, the
représentative individual boni at time s maximises, at time t :
U(i,s) =
s.t. à{t, s) = [r(t) + X]a(t, s) + w{t, s) - c(t, s)
where c(t,s) is consumption, a(t.,s) the stock of assets and w(t, s) labour
income, ail considered at time t for the individuals born at time s ; 6 and
r(t) are, respectively, the intertemporal time préférence rate and the interest
rate. A dot over a variable dénotes, as usual. its derivative with respect
to time. Notice that the usual Blanchard-Yaari actuarially fair insurance
mechanism is at work. As in Blanchard (1985), any surviving agent obtains
from the insurance companies the fraction A of her assets a(t, s) at every
instant of time; her wealth goes to the insurer when she dies5. The following
"no-Ponzi game" condition holds :
lim = a{r. s) exp ( - f [r(z) + X]dz) = 0
We assume, as in Blanchaid. ((1985) p. 235), that the effect of re-
tirement can be stylised by letting the labour income décline with âge at
a constant rate p. With logarithmic préférences, a necessary condition for
dynamic inefficiency in Blanchard1» model is a sufficiently high p, namely,
p>96.
Following usual methods, it is possible to show that the consumption
behaviour, at the individual level, is described by the following équation :
5 See also Blanchard and Fischer (1989). Notice that the présence of this mechanism is due to the absence
of any bequest motive.
6 With isoelastic préférences, the necessary condition becomes (1 — S)X + p > S6, where S is the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution. Hence, the lower S, the looser becomes this condition.Gianluca Femminis
where h(t, s), human wealth, is defined as :
/•oc ( r \
h(t, s) = / w(t, s) exp - / [r(z) + \\dz dr
Jt V h )
1.2 Population dynamics and aggregation
Given our assurnptions concerning death and birth rates, the popula
tion at time t is :
N(t) = N(0)ent; (1)
with no loss of generality, we set JV(O) = l;n = ,3 - A is the constant
population growth rate. In this model, a positive population growth rate
may be interprétée! as an effect of immigration (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1995) ch. 9).
Since logarithmic préférences entail. at the individual level, a con-
sumption function that is linear in total wealth, it is straightforward to
obtain its aggregate counterpart7 :
C=(0 + \)(A + H) (2)
Notice that, from équation (2) on, we take as understood the time
index t whenever this is not confusing. Exploiting the following boundary
condition :
lii^H{t)exp (- J [r(z) + X]dz\ = 0
we obtain, by ineans of standard techniques, the differential équations for
assets and human wealth.
À = rA + W - C (3)
W (4)
The absence of the A4 term in équation (3) is due to the insurance com-
panies' activity, which transfer resources from those who die to those who
survive : this process is not affected by the birth rate. The 0H term in équa
tion (4) reflects the fact that ail the agents, even the newborn ones, hâve
the same life expectancy (Buiter (1988) p. 283). As intuition suggests, the
discount rate of human wealth is enhanced by p, the rate of décline of labour
income.
7 The population aggregate corresponding to any individual stock or flow variable x{t, s) is defined as :
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Differentiating with respect to time équation (2) and exploiting équa
tions (3) and (4), we get the law of motion for consumption :
C = (r + n + p-e)C-(9 + \)(,8 + p)A (5)
It is useful to compare tins équation with the corresponding one in
the Ramsey model with population growth (see e.g. Blanchard and Fischer
(1989)). In that framework, the second addendum on the right hand side is
missing and per capita consumption is multiplied by (r - 0). The présence
of the n terni in our équation reflects the fact that existing agents are not
concerned about the unborn people8.
Equations (3) and (5) summarise the aggregate behaviour of our con-
tinuum of disconnected families.
2 A decreasing returns-to-scale technology
In what follows, we assume that the production side of the economy
is composed of v firms, each producing yi units of the final good. which
is used both for consumption and investment9. Every firm opérâtes with a
decreasing returns technology; capital and labour are the arguments of the
gross production function :
yi = F{Ki,Li)
In order to be able to obtain a closed form steady state, we assume that the
production function is homogeneous of degree //, and that ail the existing
firms are identical. Hence, we may express the gross production function in
intensive form :
? (6)
where k is the capital/labour ratio. Since, by hypothesis, ail firms are iden
tical, k represents also the aggregate capital/output ratio. We assume f(k)
to be strictly concave and to satisfy the condition : limfc_oo fk{k) = 0. We
also assume that capital dépréciâtes at the constant rate 6: hence, due to
profit maximisation, the real interest rate r is equal to the net marginal
productivity of capital :
r = FKi(Kt,Li)-6 = fkWLf-1 - <* (7)
Our assumption about the degree of homogeneity of the production
function implies that "pure profits" (rents) are a constant share (1 - //) of
gross output :
m = Vi - 6Ki - rKi - wU = (1 - /i)/(fc)Lf (8)
8 To get an intuition for this point, considerthat, at the per capita level, consumption is not affected by population
growth.
9 We continue to take the time index t as understood.Gianluca Femminis
where 7rt- and w dénote, respectively, rents and wages (at time t). Notice
also that gross aggregate output is :
Y = m = vf(k)L'l = j{k)L^vl->1
where the last equality exploits symmetry among firms. Aggregate output
is homogeneous of degree one in capital, labour and in the number of firms.
The présence of rents implies that the ownership of a generic firm lias
a fundamental value, Qi, which is given by :
[r(Q+p\dAdT (9)
10
In équation (9), we hâve introduced the assumption of a constant and exoge-
nous probability of failure affecting firms. The lifetime of firms is exponen-
tially distributed; hence exp[—p(r - t)] is the probability of being operative
at time r for a firm existent at time t. Since firms are owned by risk averse
consumers, the use of the interest rate in the discount intégral may seem
inadéquate. However, we assume that the number of existing firrns is large
(which is consistent with our perfectly compétitive framework) and that
consumers perfectly diversify their portfolios. Therefore each individual's
return is never affected by the failure of a spécifie firm; rather, consumers
perceive p as the (non stochastic) share of equities in their portfolio that is
"vanishing" at each instant of time. Hence, every investor behaves as if she
were risk neutral and firms use the interest rate to discount profits.
Differentiation of the forward-looking équation (9) yields the familiar
arbitrage équation :
Qi(t) = -7ri(t) + [r(t.)+p]Qi(t) (10)
implying that expected capital gains Qi(t) - pQ{(t) plus profits ix^t) must
equal what could be obtained investing the value of the firm on the bond
market, r(t)Qi{t).
We now assume that entry of new firms in the market is unrestricted
but costly. More specifically, we assume that every firm, before starting
production, has to bear a strictly positive fixed cost 0, denominated in
output.
At the level of stylised facts, a cost with thèse characteristics could
be entailed by the need, for the entrant firms, of purchasing a building,
a plant and/or sorne machinery. In this case, the probability of failure p
stylises the présence of a technology shock causing the breakdown of the
firm equipment10. Alternatively. we may think that every firm must be run
by an entrepreneur and that she must bear some cost to train herself before
A fixed scrap value for the firm can be embodied into the model without affecting the qualitative results.1 o Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 66(1), 2000
starting to manage the firm11. The free entry assumption implies that the
value of every firm must be equal to the fixed cost, Qi = 0. Therefore, the
differential équation (10) reduces to the following ordinary one :
(r +p)(f) = 7Ti
which provides a relation between per capita capital and per capita number
of firms. To see this, substitute for r and 7rt using équations (7) and (8) and
define x = v/L = (L,)"1, to get :
[fk(k)x'l~fl -6 + p]ô=(l- v)f{k)x fl (11)
This équation may be conveniently seen as a function :
x = g(k) (12)
Moreover, differentiation of (11) shows that gk{k) > 0, implying that
the accumulation of capital increases the number of existing firms.
Notice that the présence of p is made possible by the assumption of
free entry. A similar hypothesis would not be possible in the land model :
since land is conceived as a non-reproducible factor, its disruption would
lead the économie System to the collapse.
3 Characterisation of the steady-state equilibrium
This section identifies the "long-run" properties of our economy. We
set up, first, a dynamical System involving the three variables of the model :
per capita consumption, capital and number of firms. We then characterise
the steady state equilibrium : we argue that the long-run equilibrium of the
model may be dynamically inefficient and we show that, under a mild con
dition, the steady state is unique and saddlepath stable. Throughout the
section, stars will dénote steady state values for the variables.
Since we hâve assumed away public debt, assets are given by the sum
of capital and the value of firms; hence, the aggregate consumption équation
(5) is reformulated in per capita terms as follows :
c = (r + p - 9)c - (S + \)(j3 + p){k + ox) (13)
11 This interprétation requires that the présence of entrepreneurs does not create moral hazard problems to
the possibility of portfolio diversification. Also, the reward for entrepreneurs" efforts should be deducted from
profits in équation (9). (The qualitative results of the model are robust to a spécification where the reward
to entrepreneurs is proportional to the wage bill, as long as pure profits remain strictly positive. The reward
could as well be a fraction of rents at every instant of time.) Notice also that, according to this interprétation,
p should be equal to the probability of death; moreover, entrepreneurs should bear the one-off cost at the
instant of birth.Gianluca Femminis -11
where 4>x stands for the per capita value of firms. Since per capita income
rnay be used as an addition to per capita capital, for consumption or to
increase the number of firms, we can write :
k = f(k)xl~'1 - 6k -c- (p(x + px) - n{k + <j>x) (14)
The relation (12) between x and k closes the niodel.
It will prove useful to reforinulate the System composed of équation
(13) and (14). Exploiting équations (7) and (12) we get :
c = [fk(k)g{k)l-'J -6 + p-e\c-(0 + A)(,3 + p)\k 4- 4>g{k)\ (13')
To obtain the dynamic équation for capital, differentiatc with respect
to time équation (12), substitute ont for x in équation (14) and solve the
resulting expression for k :
k = [1 -f àgk{k))~l{f(k)g{k)l~tl - 6k - c - d)pg(k) - n[k + og(k)}} (14')
Notice that, since x = gk{k)k. in steady state the aggregate rents (=
(r+p)oxL) grows at the aggregate growth rate (n), an important différence
with Tirole's (1985) paper.
We now show that the condition for dynamic efficiency is the sarae
that. holds in the standard niodel with constant-returns-to-scale at the firm
level; we will then characterise the steady state.
Proposition 1. The steady state is dynamically efficient if r ^ n.
Proof. Differentiating with respect to k the steady state locus for capital
obtained from équation (14'), one gets :
de _ i .
dk ■ ~ ^^^^f - ô + (1 - p)f{k)gk(k)g(k) * - 4>p()k{k) - n[\ + <t>gk(k)]
Using (11) to substitute out for (1 -n)f(k)g{k)->' in the last équation,
it is immédiate to réalise that consumption is maximised when the interest
rate is equal to the population growth rate :
dc_
dk
k={) = \fk(k)g(k)1 ll ~ S - n][l + ôgk(k)} = (r - n)[l + 0gk(k)} (15)
Hence, per capita consumption is decreasing when r < ??.. (
We now prove :
Proposition 2. // a non-trivial steady state exists, the interest rate (r*
must be i) lower than ,3 4- 6, and ii) higher than max{-/;; 0 - p}.12 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 66(1), 2000
Proof. Part i) follows Blanchard ((1985) pp. 237-38) and is proved by
contradiction. If r* ^ {3 + 6, since, from (13'),
(r* +p- 0)c* = (6 + X)(3 + p)[k* + <!%(& )],
it follows that
{P + p)c" ^(6 + \){0 + p)[k* + <j>g{k*)]y
or
c* *Z (0 + \)[k* + èg{k*)]
However, from équation (14'), we obtain that, in steady state,
c* = fik'Mk*)1-'1 - 6k - èpg(k') - n[k* + <pg(k")]
Therefore
(6 + \)[k* + èg(k*)} > ttk'Mk')1-» - 6k* - <ppg{km) - n[k* + ôg{k*)}
or
r*[k" + d>g(k*)} >(6 + Ï3)[k* + ^(fc")l > f(k*)9(k*)1-'1 - 6k* -
This cliain of (weak) inequalities implies that
Multiply both sides of (11) by g{k*) and subtract the resulting équation,




that is the desired contradiction. D
To prove part ii) one notices that équation (11) requires that r* is
higher than -p; r* must also be higher than 0 - p (équation 13') so as to
allow for a positive steady state consumption. D
The following Assumption 1 : /fc^(fc)ifc) ^ ^ allows us to Prove a
lemina useful to show existence and uniqueness of the steady state equili-
brium.Gianluca Femminis -j 3
Lemma. If Assumption 1 holds, then (j^- + (1 - mJ^t^t) < °-
Remark. Assumption 1 essentially requires that the production function
be such that, at the single firm level, wages increasc with the capital/labour
ratio12.
Proof. By totally differentiating équation (11) we obtain :
gk(k) _ (l
g{k) (l






4>fk(k)g{k)+tif(k) V h(k)' )'2
which is négative if Assumption 1 holds. n
The results obtained in Proposition 2 and in the Lemma are useful to
prove :
Proposition 3. // Assumption 1 holds, the steady state equilibrium of the
dynamic System composed of équations (13'-14') : i) exists and is unique; ii)
is locally saddlepath stable.
Proof. Part i). To prove existence and uniqueness, notice first that :
dc_
dk ( + AXfl + rip
c=Q L r+p-
— 0)~
If Assumption 1 holds, by the lemrna we see that the terni in the big
round brackets is négative. Hence :
El
~dk ( )C /)f
c=0 [ r+p-
12 Recall that the wage is given by w = -£-. [tif(k)L^ - fk(fc)Lf "1 /^] = Lf ~1 [^f(k) - fk(k)k). If, for a
Qiven Lit ^ > 0, Assumption 1 is satisfied. To see this, notice that f^ > 0 implies %-jfo- < ti - 1.
The fact that nf(k) > fk(k)k involves, in its turn, that Assumption 1 holds.14 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 66(1), 2000
= 0
Figure 1 : Qualitative dynamics of per capita consumption and capital
Recalling §§ \k=Q from (15), we notice that |f \é=Q > |f \k=Q when :
which is satisfied for r* € (-(A + /?),,5 + 6»). From Proposition 2, we know
that, if a meaningful equilibrium exists. then
Hence, in the relevant interval for r*, the consumption locus is always stee-
per than the capital locus and, if a non-trivial steady state equilibrium
exists, it is unique.
To prove existence, consider k, the capital level such that r = p + 0.
Let ci be the consumption level obtained by setting c = 0 when k = k.
Simple calculations show that ci = (0 + A)[fe + <pg{k)]- Let c2 be the con
sumption level obtained by setting k = 0 when k = k. From équation (14')
one immediately obtains :
c2 =
By properly adapting the reasoning in Proposition 2. one gets that c2 > à\.
Now notice, form équation (10) and from équation (13) that, when r tends
to max{-p,0 - p}, the c = 0 locus has a vertical asymptote. Hence, a
non-trivial steady state equilibrium exists. (Refer to Figure 1). nGianluca Femminis 15
To prove part ii), notice that the linéarisation of the dynamic System
(13'-14') in the neighbourhood of the stcady state gives :
r* + p - 0 fj(k*)->Vkk(k*)g(k*) + (1 - fi)Mk*)gk(k*)]d
-(9 + X)(P + p)[l + 4>gk{k*)]
The déterminant of the matrix above can be expressed as :
Det = [(/■* +p- 0){r* - n) - (ô + X){3 + p)][l + <j>gk(k*)]
Proposition 2 grants that, in the steady state, the first addendum
of the déterminant is négative; Assumption 1 and the lemrna imply the
negativity of the second addendum. " a
The above rcsults allow us to draw the following phase diagram, des-
cribing qualitatively the dynamics of System (13'-14'). For k < k the loci
c = 0 and k = 0 are dashed, since their properties hâve not been determined
analytically13.
4 Discussion
Proposition 1 simply tells us that, as in the standard constant-return-
to-scale model, aggregate per capita consumption is maximised when the
marginal productivity of capital is equal to the population growth rate (and
the economy is in Golden Rule).
The chain of (weak) inequalities obtained to prove part i) of Proposi
tion 2 has a précise économie meaning. It implies that the fraction fi of per
capita output is lower than (or equal to) per capita capital income. a clear
impossibility given our hypothesis concerning the degree of homogencity of
the production function.
Proposition 2 tells us also that, in our set-up, the steady state needs
not be dynamically efficient, i.e. r* may be lower than n. To interpret this
resuit, notice, first, that a suboptimal outeome is possible also when firms
do not face a probability of failure. In this case, the marginal productivity
of capital must be positive, but. it need not be higher than the population
growth rate. The économie intuition for this resuit is simple : the structure
of the entry cost implies that, in the steady state, the growth rate of the
13 To sign the "arrow fields", compule §£ t,oa"ai16 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 66(1), 2000
number of firms is equal to the one for output. Hence the existing firms do
not grow over time and, when discounting future profits, they do not modify
the interest rate with the growth rate. The fact that, in our perfect foresight
framework, rational agents can capitalise in advance the value of still non-
existing (or simply non-producing) firms is not relevant, since the value of
thèse firms, before they sank the cost, is nought. Hence. the économie system
behaves as if it could not capitalise in advance future rents, as in Tirole's
example of paintings; the fact that, in our framework, aggregate rents are
increasing over time becomes irrelevant.
Dynamic inefficiency is possible also when there is no population
growth but the probability of failure is positive. The interprétation is, again,
simple. The constancy of the entry cost implies again that, in the steady
state, the number of firms does not grow over time. Since the long run out
put is constant, due to the absence of population growth, the représentative
firm does not grow; however it takes account of the probability of failure in
evaluating future profits. This heavier discounting keeps the value of firms
positive even if the marginal productivity of capital becomes négative. This
resuit contrasts with the one by Dechert and Yamamoto, who suggested
that the présence of aggregate decreasing returns to scale résolves into a
non négative interest rate : in our model this would be true only if firms had
infinité horizon.
Our analysis implies that dynamic efficiency rnay fail, but does not
establish précise conditions for this to happen. To provide an approximate
idea about the parameters values involving dynamic inefficiency, we simulate
simple économie Systems by means of a Gauss program. We choose a Cobb-
Douglas production function at the single firm level (hence, firm's net output
is given by AK^L^~a)fl - 61<i) and we fix fi = 0.9 and a =.0.26 so that
the labour share oHncome is about two thirds. The level for /i might seem
high; however lower values imply that the portion of the parameters space
involving dynamic inefficiency is larger. The capital dépréciation parameter
is assumed equal to 10% while we set A to 10. This choice, together with
0 = 0.1, implies the existence of a large number of firms not only in the long
run but also during (almost) the entire transition towards the steady state;
however the values for A and q> proved not to affect the long-run interest
rate.
The first resuit concerns the version of the model based on the loga-
rithmic utility function that lias been used throughout the paper. We fixed
the intertemporal subjective discount rate to 2%, the probability of death
to 1.5% and the birth rate to 2.5%, implying that the population growth
(or migration) rate is a modest 1%. We assumed that the labour income
is declining at a rate equal to 2%. We then let our program to find the
"probability of failure" for firms that implies dynamic inefficiency.
For this set of parameters, the Gauss routine détermines that the
steady state equilibrium is dynamically inefficient if p ^ 4.884%, a high but
still reasonable value.Gianluca Femminis 17
We then consider a version of the model allowing for the isoelastic uti-
lity function. Hence, the représentative individual boni at time s maximises,
at time t :
U(t,a) =
wherc R is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Under
this assumption, we added p = 2% to the set of numerical values provided
for the parameters, and we let our prograin to détermine the highest pos
sible level for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution that implies ove-
raccumulation of capital. It turris out that the stcady state equilibrium is
inefficient if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is lower than 0.7129,
a value compatible with most of the available estimâtes14.
5 Concluding remarks
Tirole, in his well-known (1985) paper. suggested that decreasing re-
turns technologies could be considered as assets bringing a real rent. Ho-
wever, in his analysis, lie did not discuss explicitly such a case;rather he
assurncd that the total rent is constant over time and he concluded that,
the standard exogenous growth model might lead to a dynamically ineffi-
cient equilibrium. Dechert and Yamamoto analysed explicitly a stochastic
overlapping générations model with aggregate production characterised by
decreasing returns;they found that the stock market is effective in ruling
out the possibility of an inefficient, steady state.
The perspective of this paper is somewhat différent : decreasing re-
turns technologies are regarded as assets that can be "produced" at some
cost. This approach allowed us to détermine endogenously the number of
firms and we could consider population growth without reaching the rather
dissatisfying conclusion that the share of rents rnust steadily grow over time.
We assumed that the entry cost for firms, i.e. the price that must
be paid to replicate the asset, is constant over time and we found that a
dynamically inefficient long run equilibrium is possible in case of population
growth. This resuit is related to the constancy of the entry cost., which
implies that any existing firm docs not grow over time. Hence, in discounting
future profits, firms do not modify the interest rate with the growth rate : if
population increases, the interest. rate might be lower than the growth rate.
14 If we consider a lower birth rate, setting f3 = 0.015, therefore ruling out population growth, the critical value
becomes 0.4861. If the departure from our baseline parameters consists in a lower probability of failure for
firms, p = 0.015, the model implies dynamic inefficiency for an elasticity of intertemporal substitution lower
than 0.6088. The "perturbation" that seems to cause the most relevant réduction in the critical value is a
decrease in p from 2% to 1%. In this case the growth-corrected interest rate becomes négative when the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution is lower than 0.1685.18 Recherches économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 66(1), 2000
Notice that, in contrast to Tirole (1985), the growth of the aggregate rent
is not relevant for this argument.
Since decreasing returns technologies are considered "reproducible as-
sets" we could introduce a probability of failure for firms. This distinguishes
our model also frorn the ones considering the rôle of land (Me Callum (1987),
Homburg (1991) and Rhee (1991)). It turns out that thèse models hâve
very différent implications when compared to the framework developed in
the présent paper : they suggest that, whenever the aggregate rent does not
vanish in the long run, inefficient equilibria are ruled out. In our model, if
the probability of failure is positive, dynamically inefficient equilibria are
possible even with constant aggregate rent and stationary population. As
we pointed out earlier, in the steady state, the représentative finn does
not grow due to the characteristics of the sunk cost; however, the firm ta-
kes account of the probability of failure in evaluating future profits. This
heavier discounting keeps the value of firms positive even if the marginal
productivity of capital becomes négative.
Hence, the présent paper clarifies that decreasing returns technologies
do not necessarily rule out dynamic inefficiency. Also, some numerical exer
cises suggest that the parameter space involving capital overaccumulation
with decreasing returns at the firm's level is relevant.Gianluca Femminis 19
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